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I
NTERVIEW
North Korean Nuclear Test Announcement and Implications

CNN Interview with Daniel Poneman
Aired October 9, 2006
 

U.S. Pushing Resolution at Security Council on North Korea; Chinese Policy Toward North Korean Nukes Uncertain

KYRA PHILLIPS, CNN ANCHOR: Hello everyone. I'm Kyra Phillips. Welcome back to CNN NEWSROOM.....

PHILLIPS: Difficult at best, nonexistent at worst. And the worst is the norm. Negotiations between North Korea and the outside world. Let's bring in a man with some firsthand experience, former negotiator Daniel Poneman. Daniel, good to see you. I guess first of all your reaction today there was talk about this alleged nuclear test. Some critics coming forward saying, look, it's a seismic event, it could just be explosions. North Korea is saying its a nuclear test and it might not be that.

DANIEL PONEMAN, FORMER U.S. N. KOREA NEGOTIATOR: It's possible. I think that you have to wait till all the seismic data is analyzed. If there is no venting of radioactivity as the North Korean's have asserted, it's in fact rather hard to tell especially with a small yield. That having been said I don't think there is any serious doubt in the community that North Korea has either the material to make a successful test or likely the technology.

PHILLIPS: Where is North Korea getting the materials?

PONEMAN: Well, they have been generating materials themselves in their own production reactor which we successfully shut down for a number of years in the 1990s and in early negotiation. But with the breakdown of the whole agreed framework that we negotiated with the North Koreans, they've been generating more plutonium. We now think they have probably enough for about 10 to 12 bombs.

PHILLIPS: Well what happened, why did that change? You were involved in that negotiation in 1994, I believe. And that was -- their nuclear program was supposed to be frozen, right?

PONEMAN: Well we were very careful about how we talked about it. We froze their plutonium program. What happened was, a number of years later, the United States detected a clandestine uranium enrichment program. That's the other way to get the bomb. And when we called the North Koreans on it, it led to a disintegration of the relationship which ended up with the departure of North Korea from the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and now apparently a nuclear weapons test.

PHILLIPS: So why is it taking the U.S. -- you would think with something like this, because I know there were, through the night conference calls among military and political leaders. You would think that these tests would happen quickly, efficiently, and we would know right now, we wouldn't be playing this guessing game throughout the day. How long does it take to get a secure test result?

PONEMAN: Well, again, it depends on the data. You know, there's still debate now years and years later about an event that happened in the south Atlantic in September 1979. If you have a mushroom cloud, if you have venting of radioactivity you know very, very quickly indeed. But if it's a small test and if there is ambiguity in the data it could take days, it could take weeks and we may never know.

PHILLIPS: Meanwhile, within the past hour and a half, we've learned about these sanctions that have been -- or are being proposed. Right here, including a trade band on military and luxury items, the power to inspect all cargo entering or leaving the country and freezing assets connected with its weapons programs. Will these work? Is this the answer?

PONEMAN: Look, I don't think any one-dimensional program or policy is the answer. I think clearly, clearly, we need to show North Korea that there is a significant downside to their continued use of and exploitation of nuclear weapons. That having been said we have to give them something to say yes to. There I would go back to the September principles agreed last year among the six parties, including North Korea that would lead to a denuclearized Korean peninsula. If we could show them an up side to doing the right thing and a clear down side for doing the wrong thing, at least we'd have a chance.

PHILLIPS: Ok, so how do you prove that? What is the downside that you prove? What is the upside that you prove? Because Kim Jong- Il, so many leaders in this country thinks he's absolutely crazy and it won't matter what you try to prove to him. This is a guy that doesn't think on a rational level.

PONEMAN: You know, I think that is a very common view and I think extraordinarily misleading. If you look, I think this leader has played a very poor hand, very shrewdly, very shrewdly indeed. I think the only way Kyra to get back to your question to get this right is to have a clear solid message, beginning with the P-5 in the Security Council. We need China, we need our treaty allies, South Korea and Japan. We all have to say the same thing and what we have to say is, you, North Korea, if you comply with our expectations about nonproliferation can look to a safe, secure, energy-rich future. If you don't you can look to increased isolation and hardship and I think it has to be that clear and that blunt.

PHILLIPS: Daniel Poneman, I appreciate your time today.

PONEMAN: Thank you.

 

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