Dan Poneman: "Export Controls 2002: The Year to Reform"

September 11 provided a grim reminder of the need not only to cooperate closely with our allies, but also to prevent advanced technologies from falling into the hands of terrorists. Export controls are critical to this effort. Unfortunately, the current system – designed for the Cold War world – is badly out of date. To be effective against today’s threats, export controls require major reform.

The need for reform...

The Cold War provided a clear enemy. At the same time, the U.S. government dominated – through its own research and development – the critical technologies that needed to be controlled. Allied solidarity was strong enough to support an effective, multilateral system of export controls (COCOM), which kept the most advanced technologies from leaking to the Warsaw Pact, contributing both to the military and economic collapse of the Soviet Union.

The world has changed. In addition to hostile regimes, we confront a shadowy network of terrorists who slip easily across national borders. In contrast to the past, critical technologies are now being developed commercially in many countries, and adopted by governments. COCOM has been replaced by the far weaker Wassenaar Arrangements.

The effect of applying Cold War-era controls in the post-Cold War world is not surprising. As international trade in technology has multiplied in complexity and volume, our outdated system of export controls has become more burdensome but less effective. The U.S. continues to retain separate lists, rules, and bureaucracies to control "dual-use" as well as "munitions" items even as technological advances increasingly blur the boundary between the two; certainly terrorist procurement networks are not constrained by such artificial distinctions. Meanwhile, the increasingly global availability of dangerous technology dooms any export control effort absent strong multilateral cooperation. In other words, today’s export controls do not trade profits for security; they undermine both.

Go after needles, not haystacks...

How should we adapt to these new circumstances? The best way to protect our technological edge is to unleash the energy and creativity that underpin the great history of American invention. This does not imply that we should abandon export controls, but does suggest that we should apply them intelligently, and resist them where they stifle American innovation more than they constrain foreign adversaries. In order to be effective, export controls must focus on controlling technologies, components, and systems that are (1) chokepoints on the critical path to acquiring military or terrorist capabilities, and (2) not widely available from foreign sources. The Administration-supported Export Administration Act represents a step in the right direction, but only a step. For example, export controls can also damage our national security when they impede defense cooperation with our closest allies, e.g., in the co-development of advanced military systems. Where export controls are ineffective, or block our own technological progress, they should be abandoned. We should go after the needles, not the haystacks.

In addition to updating our export controls, we must also reform how they are administered. In the Internet Age, this should begin with streamlined procedures and full use of modern information technology. Focusing controls more sharply on critical technologies will help. We should also assure that the U.S. export control system for munitions as well as dual-use items is governed by simple tenets of good government: transparency among government agencies, deadlines that are clear and binding, default to decision rather than to stalemate, and accountability of the Cabinet secretary responsible for maintaining these procedural disciplines. Indeed, the need for a modern and efficient system raises the question whether the preservation of two parallel systems still makes sense, or whether our national security would be better served by an integrated system for administering both dual-use and munitions controls.

Multilateral coordination and enforcement is essential...

Export control reform cannot succeed if we proceed in isolation. Multilateral coordination and enforcement is essential, beginning with a collective effort to develop the best data on today’s global marketplace, detailing what technologies are available from what suppliers. Answering that question will help the Administration complete a realistic assessment of where controls can be effective and where they cannot. We should also consider initiatives to streamline licensing for close allies that cooperate with us in managing and enforcing export controls. In this way, we can enhance the effectiveness of both export controls and the military capabilities of our coalition partners who join us in combating terrorism.

The events of September 11 offer the best opportunity in a generation to build a multilateral approach to export controls, so that terrorists and proliferators cannot play one supplier off against another. All significant suppliers – including Russia and China – must cooperate fully if this effort is to be truly effective.

For far too long, we have tended to view export controls as inexorably pitting national security against commercial interests. While such a tension surely will continue to exist in individual cases, a reformed export control system can strengthen both American security and American competitiveness. The Administration and the Congress have a unique opportunity to achieve that objective in 2002.