Considering the odds, the Sharm el-Sheikh deal brokered by President Clinton to end the violence between Israelis and Palestinians must be regarded as a real accomplishment. But what happens next? What are the prospects that the agreement will hold and the bloodshed will stop, much less that the peace process can be put back on track? The answers to those questions can be found in part in the events that led up to the current crisis.

One proximate cause of the violence that has so devastated the peace process was, ironically, the summit between Ehud Barak and Yasir Arafat that President Clinton convened at Camp David last summer to reach a "final settlement" on the outstanding issues. Recall that Arafat made clear before Camp David that he thought a meeting was "premature." A summit was opposed by large segments of the Palestinian movement and was feared by many Arab leaders who were concerned that Arafat would be bludgeoned into unacceptable concessions, especially on Jerusalem. Given his assessment, Arafatıs appearance at Camp David, far from an indication that he had come to make a deal, was largely the result of what amounted to intense political pressure from Clinton.

Clinton nevertheless pushed for the summit when he did because of his concern about Barakıs perilous political position in Israel and due to what might be called the tyranny of the presidential schedule, i.e., from a scheduling perspective, it was a "good" time for a summit before he had to depart for Japan and the G-7 meeting. There was not, however, a looming real world deadline that compelled the parties to come together to find common ground. When they failed to do so and the summit collapsed, not only the Israelis, but also the Americans who were supposed to be the "neutral" mediators, blamed Arafat for its failure. And when Arafat then visited Arab and other presumably friendly capitals in search of support for a "unilateral declaration of [Palestinian] independence," he found precious little. Thus isolated, sending his partisans to the streets increasingly may have looked like the best tactic still open to him.

In Israel, Barakıs far-reaching, but ultimately unsuccessful, proposals at Camp David did not create a new, more viable base, but instead had the effect of intensifying the partisan political strife. His domestic political position was disintegrating, and he faced the prospect of being defeated on a no-confidence vote when the Knesset returned from its summer recess in late October. At the same time, within the opposition Likud party, Ariel Sharon was facing a major leadership challenge from the newly resurgent Binyamin Netanyahu, no longer under indictment for corruption. Unless Sharon did something to solidify his hawkish credentials, he stood a very good chance of being toppled.

Thus were sown the seeds for the current crisis. Sharonıs incendiary tour of the Temple Mount was largely the product of the intra-Likud fight for party leadership. It not only triggered an authentic and probably initially spontaneous rage among Palestinians, but also provided a perfect opportunity for Arafat to try to re-establish his position both within the Palestinian movement and among Arab leaders. And when the violence erupted, a politically besieged Barak determined that a swift and forceful response was the best ­ and perhaps only ­ course of action open to him.

Viewing Sharm el-Sheikh against this backdrop raises the twin questions of whether any of these underlying dynamics has been fundamentally changed by the agreement and, if not, what are the prospects that the deal will prove durable. It is hard to be optimistic.

Barak probably is in a marginally better political position to show restraint, having demonstrated his "determination" by making the last escalatory move prior to the Sharm el-Sheikh agreement, seeming to get an undertaking by Arafat to call on his followers to end the violence, and fending off the most offensive version of Arafatıs push for an "international commission of inquiry." His willingness to take some modest conciliatory steps in the wake of Sharm el-Sheikh ­ a limited pullback of Israeli forces and a small increase in the freedom of Palestinian movement ­ indicate a desire to reverse the spiral of violence.

If anything, Sharm el-Sheikh will increase the pressure on Sharon to demonstrate his hawkish credentials, lest he be outflanked on the right by Netanyahu in the struggle to control Likud. At least in the short term, however, Sharonıs refusal to join Barak in a national unity government helps to avoid a further poisoning of relations between Israel and more moderate Palestinians.

But make no mistake. These initial steps toward restraint are limited, tentative, and fragile. Israel remains poised to react forcefully to future provocations. The Israelis, puzzled and more than a little resentful that the "restraint" they showed in last Thursdayıs retaliatory attacks following the Ramallah lynchings got them no credit, may decide next time that the risks of further restraint outweigh the benefits. In that case, a renewed outbreak of violence could escalate very rapidly.

Arafat went to Sharm el-Sheikh over the objection of what is probably a majority of the Palestinian factions, and largely in response to irresistible pressure from moderate Arab leaders who feared that the Israeli-Palestinian crisis was spinning out of control. The "agreement" reached at Sharm el-Sheikh -- which actually was a statement read by President Clinton that neither the Israeli nor Palestinian leader signed -- is being second-guessed by many Palestinians, criticized by others, and roundly denounced by militants inside and outside the PLO. The fact that Arafat very quickly insisted that he made no "agreement" with Barak, and has refused to call directly and personally on the Palestinians in the streets to show restraint and restore calm, is hardly encouraging. More generally, it must be acknowledged that not only are there real questions about Arafatıs ability to control his Palestinian "followers," but that violence ­ past and perhaps future ­ could be seen by him to serve several interests.

First, it has turned the fury of the Palestinians away from the corrupt and inept Palestinian Authority for which he is responsible, and toward the Israelis. Second, it has unified all manner of Palestinian factions in common cause against Israel ­ albeit at the substantial cost of embracing those most opposed to any peaceful settlement with Israel ­ diverting them from their ongoing efforts to undermine him and his position. Third, he may believe that it will strengthen his position in any future peace negotiations, or at least strengthen his international standing when he continues to reject the proposals and compromises that flowed from last summerıs Camp David summit. Finally, as noted above, he may feel that he has few, if any, other sources of leverage.

For reasons such as these, Arafat may calculate that he has more to lose than to gain by joining the ranks of the peacemakers. But even if Arafat does make what, for him, would be an uncharacteristically bold departure, last Thursdayıs events provide vivid evidence that violence has a dynamic all its own. In such an environment, even serious, sustained diplomacy may be no match for what is likely to be the continuing onslaught of inflammatory rhetoric, a succession of funerals of Palestinian "martyrs" or Israeli "heroes," episodes of vigilantism by Israeli settlers or enraged Palestinians, and deliberate acts of provocation by irreconcilable militants on both sides, to say nothing of random incidents that spark a new round of escalation.

For now, the question is how to solidify and sustain the respite provided by Sharm el-Sheikh, not how to resume the peace process. Events over the past three weeks have rendered both the premises and the proposals of Camp David invalid, and Sharm el-Sheikh has done nothing to repair the damage. It is likely that much time will pass before Barak and Arafat will be prepared to meet again in face-to-face negotiations. And, given the turmoil in Israeli politics and growing factionalism within the Palestinian movement, there is some question whether they will even be the "negotiating partners" when that time comes.

Moreover, with a lame duck American administration winding down, and neither side viewing the United States as impartial, Washington probably will not be in a position to re-energize the peace process for months to come. During this period, it will take hard work and more than a little luck simply to keep the lid on. The focus should be on trying to achieve that goal which, under the circumstances, must be regarded as ambitious. An American initiative to reach further and attempt to restart the peace talks any time soon, is very likely to do more harm than good.

Arab leaders are convening in Cairo this weekend. Barring a dramatic upturn in violence before then, this Arab summit can have a critical impact, for good or ill. Moderate Arab leaders share our stake in getting and keeping the crisis under control, but also face real political pressures and demands flowing from fear of potentially threatening demonstrations in their own streets and a genuine (if restrained) belief in Arab brotherhood.

If the Arab leaders come together to build on the Sharm el-Sheikh agreement ­ both at and after the Cairo summit ­ it could have a very salutary effect, increasing the prospects that the violence will abate and hastening the time when the peace process can resume. If, on the other hand, the Arab leaders limit themselves to joining in a chorus of condemnation of Israel (now being previewed in the UN General Assembly resolution), the cease-fire reached at Sharm el-Sheikh may prove to be only a brief interlude before the eruption of an even worse cycle of bloodshed. Responsible behavior, never in ample supply on this issue, will be required from all sides.