Within weeks, North Korea may start reprocessing 8,000 spent fuel rods containing enough plutonium for five to six nuclear weapons. Today we have no good options to confront that threat. But if we do not act now, our options will only get worse.

North Korea may already possess one or two nuclear weapons, but U.S. policy correctly calls for the Korean Peninsula to be free of all nuclear weapons. In a matter of months, the six to eight bombs' worth of plutonium Pyongyang could then possess would be enough to support an offensive military strategy -- and to export. North Korea has announced the restart of its existing nuclear reactor, and it could finish construction of two larger reactors that were frozen under the 1994 Agreed Framework. Within a few years it could be churning out dozens of bombs' worth of plutonium each year. By then, its secret enrichment program could be producing bomb-grade uranium, too.

Under those circumstances, intense pressure would build in South Korea and Japan to acquire nuclear weapons. The reverberations would quickly extend to Taiwan and China, then India and Pakistan.

If North Korea continues to view unconventional weapon exports as its chief cash crop, it will find numerous customers with adequate means and motive. Access to plutonium could shave years off the efforts of al Qaeda and other terrorists to obtain the weapon of ultimate destruction.

We cannot afford to defer this issue. Time is on North Korea's side; each day increases North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities, enhancing its military strength and bargaining leverage -- while narrowing our options to respond. The North Korean regime will ultimately follow other dictatorships into oblivion, but this will not happen soon enough to spare us the terrible consequences of its acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, if North Korea builds up its nuclear arsenal while it sees the United States diverted by Iraq, it may enhance its ability to survive that much longer and inflict that much more harm.

What to do? First we should make clear to North Korea that separating plutonium from the spent fuel rods at Yongbyon represents an unacceptable threat to U.S. and allied security. We should work with our allies in Seoul and Tokyo to make clear that separation of that plutonium from the spent fuel would constitute a "red line" that Pyongyang would cross only at its peril. While attacking the Yongbyon facility is an option of last resort, the best way to ensure that we do not need to consider it is to deter Pyongyang now by demonstrating strategic clarity on this point.

Second, we should propose to North Korea that, in exchange for freezing all nuclear activities, we would be prepared to discuss the full range of security issues affecting the peninsula.  While the president is right not to yield to blackmail, under this approach there is no need to "pay" Pyongyang to adhere to past commitments. Instead the United States should propose to go beyond the 1994 Agreed Framework to a comprehensive approach that, for example, expands the inspection rights of the International Atomic Energy Agency throughout North Korea and immediately secures the removal of the 8,000 spent fuel rods from the peninsula.

In exchange for such an expanded set of obligations, the United States should be willing to provide the kind of security assurances North Korea seeks, as well as other steps to bring North Korea into the community of nations. As the president has said, our quarrel is not with the North Korean people, so steps to improve their lot through increased trade and communications could be considered favorably.

The United States should be willing to enter into these discussions in any forum, multilateral or bilateral. The urgency of the crisis brooks no delay over matters of form. Moreover, direct talks represent no substantive concession to Pyongyang; allowing plutonium reprocessing would.

While the North Korean challenge clearly is multilateral in nature, pressing Beijing, Seoul, Tokyo and Moscow to act is no surrogate for U.S. leadership. First, these governments may join a U.S.-led consensus, but they are unlikely to support a U.S. vision of concerted action if Washington stands in the wings. Second, in order to persuade reluctant governments to apply meaningful pressure on Pyongyang, the United States needs to show a serious effort to resolve the situation through diplomacy.

If the United States offers a clear vision of the diplomatic solution it favors -- and a road map to get there -- it can mobilize an international consensus on the North Korean challenge. Only a united international community can muster enough pressure to induce North Korea to reverse course. Otherwise, we will soon face a rampant plutonium production program that could spark a nuclear arms race in Asia and provide deadly exports to America's most implacable enemies.

Brent Scowcroft was national security adviser under Presidents Gerald R. Ford and George H.W. Bush. He is founder and president of the Forum for International Policy. Daniel Poneman was on the National Security Council staff under Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton.